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1 Introduction 
In December 1989, a democratic president was elected in Chile. The 16-year Pinochet 
dictatorship had been defeated by a national vote. The Concertación had a simple but 
widely supported strategic vision—democracy and equitable growth. On three accounts 
the defeated authoritarian regime had shown a very poor outcome: it had interrupted a 
long democratic tradition; there had been very little growth (3 per cent per cent per year 
between 1974-89 amounting to 1.5 per cent in per capita terms); and income had 
become more concentrated resulting in an increase in poverty (amounting to 38.6 per 
cent of the population in 1990).1 
 
During the past 16 years the Concertación government has carried through deep and 
simultaneous changes in the economic, social and political dimension. Some of the 
economic reforms, like opening up the economy, were built on changes made by the 
authoritarian regime. But the Concertación strategy assumed that simultaneous reforms 
should reinforce each other in promoting democratization and growth with equity. 
Throughout these 16 years there has been a permanent, coherent and fruitful effort from 
the government to advance in this strategic direction. 
 
The political scenario in which this reform process took place was a complicated one, 
because most legal reforms require high majorities in Parliament where the right-wing 
opposition parties are over-represented (due to the electoral system inherited from 
Pinochet). Whenever political agreements were reached, they occurred in Congress and 
always on specific issues, never on a national vision. There never has been an explicit 
agreement around the vision that involves all social and political stakeholders of Chile. 
This has implied very lengthy and repetitive discussion, particularly on the ways to 
finance the reforms. This fact, as will be seen, has retarded and weakened the effects of 
the reforms particularly in the equity objective. 
 
All in all, the implementation of the Concertación Vision shows positive results. 
Increasing competitiveness was the way chosen to promote growth. Competitiveness 
was sought through macroeconomic reforms to stabilize and continue opening the 
economy, complemented by microeconomic reforms to increase efficiency and 
productivity. Their outcome has been positive. Chile in the last 20 years has averaged an 
annual per capita growth rate of 4.2 per cent. According to the IMF database, Chile 
ranks ninth among the fastest growing economies in this period. The majority of the 
countries that are ahead of Chile have a much lower income per capita and thus are less 
affected by convergence. 
 
                                                 
1 All data references in this text that do not have a source can be found in the Monthly Bulletin of the 
Central Bank of Chile. A compilation of this information, up to year 2000, can be found in Banco Central 
de Chile (2001).   2
Chile also experienced a sharp reduction in poverty. According to Mideplan (2004), 
total poverty decreased from 38.6 per cent in 1990 to 18.8 per cent per cent in 2003; 
while the incidence of extreme poverty decreased from 12.9 per cent to 4.7 per cent in 
the same period. Chile had the most rapid decrease in poverty in Latin America and is 
the only country that has reached the poverty Millennium Development Goal. 
 
Also very important reforms were completed to strengthen democratic governance. The 
most important, were the constitutional reforms finally approved by Congress in June 
2005 which eliminate the most important non-democratic institutions that had been put 
in place by the Pinochet regime. Before that, important institutional changes were 
implemented particularly in the economic area. These changes, according to the World 
Bank, placed Chile among the 15 countries with better institutional quality.2  
 
These outcomes place Chile among the more successful developing countries. But Chile 
also has important current problems. As will be seen, there is still low value added and 
diversification of exports, low investment in R&D and human capital; insufficient 
support to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); problems of coverage in social 
areas; health, preschool education and pensions; also a very unequal income distribution 
with a relatively low tax burden; and an electoral system that over represents the 
minority. This study will analyze the instruments (competitiveness, social reforms and 
institutional change) used to reach the three pillars of the Chilean development 
strategy—growth, equity, and democratic governance—as well as the remaining 
challenges.  
2  Growth and competitiveness 
2.1  Strong macro fundamentals and open trade 
From the very beginning the democratic governments aimed at reducing inflation and 
continue opening the economy. Reaching strong macro fundamentals was the 
instrument to promote investment, considered the main restriction to economic growth. 
Opening the economy was the instrument to turn exports into the engine of growth. 
Investment and exports were the two main economic pillars of the growth strategy. 
 
During the military regime, tariffs were reduced in a very significant manner. From an 
average tariff of over 100 per cent they were reduced to a flat one of 15 per cent. 
Democratic governments continued the unilateral reduction of import duties (to its 
present level of a flat 6 per cent) and initiated the negotiations of free trade agreements 
(FTAs) as a complementary way of opening the economy. Chile has now signed FTAs 
                                                 
2 See Kaufmann et al. The institutions are those related to voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, and economic freedom 
ranking.    3
with all American countries (except Cuba), the European Union, China and some other 
countries in Asia and Oceania. These FTAs cover 65 per cent of the world’s population 
and about 80 per cent of Chilean trade. Additionally, it is presently negotiating trade 
agreements with Japan and India. 
 
The FTAs not only continued to open the economy (the effective tariff after the 
agreements is below 2 per cent) but also changed the economic features of the country. 
Chile grew from being a small economy (15 million inhabitants with an income per 
capita PPP (2005) of U$10,981) into an export producing country where domestic firms 
could trade on the larger global market with quite advantageous conditions. This feature 
was an additional source of attraction for foreign direct investment (FDI). 
 
Simultaneously, an effort was made to strengthen fiscal accounts and reduce inflation 
that was increasing at the time of the democratic transition (yearly inflation at the end of 
1989 was 25.6 per cent). Although in 1989 there was a surplus in the fiscal accounts, it 
was financed by a large sum of non-permanent government revenues that came from 
privatizations and an unusually high price of copper. Thus, a tax reform was proposed 
and approved to make compatible fiscal balance with the necessary increase in social 
expenditure to promote equity. 
 
The Concertación governments have kept a permanent surplus in fiscal accounts with 
the only exemption of the years of the Asian crisis that had a large effect on the price of 
copper which in turn has a large impact on government revenues. Because of this, in 
2000 a new fiscal rule was established. This implied maintaining a structural surplus of 
1 per cent of GNP on the fiscal accounts, which has been strictly kept. The structural 
surplus calculates the budget considering the revenues that would exist with a tendential 
rate of growth, which is very significantly affected by the price of copper. Thus when 
the price of copper is down, the rule enables a deficit. This happened in 2000-03 (where 
it reached a maximum of 1 per cent of GNP). But when the price of copper is above its 
tendency it forces a surplus, as we have now (in 2004 fiscal accounts had a surplus of 
2.2 per cent of GNP). This insures countercyclical government spending, as well as a 
tendency towards larger government savings (that in the future could be used to cover 
deficits in the private pension system). This fiscal innovation is a very attractive tool for 
all developing countries whose export structure is very intensive in commodities that 
experience sharp and frequent changes in prices with its consequent cyclical effect on 
growth and fiscal accounts.  
 
A strict fiscal policy plus an autonomous central bank (since 1990) with inflation 
targeting (2-4 per cent) drastically decreased inflation to its present and within the target 
level (1999-2004 averaged 2.6 per cent). At the same time it has been permanently 
reducing the country’s risk, up to its present level (August 2005) of 52 basic points of 
Chilean sovereign debt over the US treasury bonds, which places Chile among the three 
lower country risks in emerging markets This creates a very significant difference in the   4
cost of capital relative to other Latin American countries (average 300 basic points) and 
contributes to explain the larger increase in investment and growth. 
2.2 Microeconomic  efficiency 
In order to increase competitiveness, since the early 1990s an effort has been made to 
improve microeconomic efficiency in four main policy areas: infrastructure, human 
capital, productive development (R&D and support to SMEs), and strengthening 
economic institutions (mostly regulatory and anti-trust). In 2001, with much the same 
purpose, a ‘pro-growth agenda’ was agreed between government and business. This 
agenda was geared towards improving transparency and efficiency in the public sector, 
overcoming market failures and stimulating private participation in the provision of 
public goods. Public policies in this area were horizontal, that is the benefits were open 
to all sectors of the economy. As well as pro-competition, given a market distortion, a 
first attempt was to stimulate competition and if this was not successful, regulate the 
market with a framework that emulated competition.  
 
Promoting private investment in infrastructure and public goods, was aimed to improve 
the global connectivity of the Chilean economy. The private sector was incorporated in 
the provision of public utilities, as well as, in all kinds of infrastructure. In order to do 
this, new regulatory bodies were created that enabled the participation of the private 
sector and/or authorized the privatization of existing infrastructure. Particular emphasis 
was placed in promoting and/or emulating competition in each sector, as a means of 
transferring the gains of productivity to consumers and users of public utilities and 
infrastructure. 
 
In the last decade, 62 projects for over U$7 billion have been granted as concessions to 
the private sector to build and operate highways, ports, airports, trains, buses, prisons 
and hospitals. Additionally the privatization of the telecommunication and water and 
sewage services brought enormous investments with the consequent improvement in 
efficiency (tariffs) and quality. The electricity sector was already privatized, but there 
was an important change in its regulatory bodies and very significant amounts of FDI in 
it. The outcome of these changes is very positive. Chile has a 100 per cent digitalized 
telecommunication system, it is connected to three international fibre optics networks, 
and ranks among the first 15 in all transportation and communication variables of the 
IMD competitiveness report.3 This is an important achievement considering that in the 
early 1990s infrastructure was one of the least competitive sectors of the Chilean 
economy according to the same report.  
 
Investment in human capital was also a very high priority. Since 1990 public 
expenditure in education has more than tripled, increasing its participation from 2.5 to 4 
per cent of GNP. According to UNESCO, Chile’s total expenditure in education 
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amounts to 7.3 per cent of GNP which favourably compares to the 5.4 per cent of 
OECD countries. Simultaneously an important effort was made to increase investment 
in training of the labour force (it increased over 100 per cent). Although the increase in 
investment enabled a large improvement in the coverage of these services, it still has a 
long way to go in terms of quality. For example, Chile is reaching 100 per cent coverage 
of secondary education, but it is lagging behind in preschool coverage and in quality, it 
ranks 37 for education systems and 55 in pupil/teacher ratios. Access to training 
programmes for workers, although increasing at a fast pace, is very limited for SMEs 
and inexistent for self-employed workers which are precisely the sectors with lower 
productivity.  
 
The increase in coverage of education was particularly high in universities (more than 
double) reaching 37.5 per cent of the population, which still compares unfavourably to 
the 65 per cent figure for developed countries. A good example of the social and 
economic impact of this progress is that presently 70 per cent of all university students 
are the first members of their families to reach this educational level; a very significant 
change that will transform the quality of life for these families and productivity in the 
country. The total impact of the very large increase in investment in human capital is 
still to be felt in terms of equitable growth. 
 
From the very beginning the Concertación Government aimed at reaching what was 
called the second phase of the export model, one more intensive in value added. For this 
purpose public research funds were created to stimulate R&D in the private sector and 
to strengthen the link with universities. As well as a programme to support productivity 
growth and market penetration for SMEs, mostly through stimulating its association. 
Although existing evaluations of these programmes show very positive results, their size 
did not enable them to have a very large impact. Their limited funds plus the 
‘horizontal’ criteria (to avoid ‘picking the winners’) in the definition of public R&D 
policy attempted against real progress. Moving towards a cluster approach around the 
existing export sectors, could take the Chilean economy faster to an export structure 
more intensive in value added. As will be seen, R&D is still a competitive disadvantage 
for the Chilean economy and SMEs have kept the 75 per cent productivity gap they had 
with large firms. The final goal of moving into the second phase of export growth was 
not reached either. 
 
Chile also invested in modernizing economic institutions to increase transparency and 
efficiency. Since 1990 it has completed a reform of the entire judicial system. It has 
transformed all regulatory institutions and its legislation, it has created a fair 
competition tribunal and an independent tax tribunal. It has new legislation and 
institutions on consumer protection, industrial property rights and international 
commercial arbitration. It also legislated on corporate governance and venture capital 
industry. It has improved the legislation on private pension funds and incorporated 
voluntary savings in it.    6
The positive impact of these transformations can be appreciated in several international 
reports. The IMD (2004) Competitiveness Report ranks Chile 1st in central bank 
policies and 2nd in pro-business country and management of public finances, 6th in 
financial institutions transparency, and 8th in government efficiency. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit ranks Chile 15th in its offshore environment ranking and says that, 
‘Chile outshines its neighbours, luring investment with educated workers and strong IT 
skills … Chile is the strongest performing Latin American country’. Transparency 
International ranks Chile 20th (out 145 countries) in its level of corruption. 
2.3  Exports and investment the two engines of growth and competitiveness. 
The macro and microeconomic reforms were geared towards increasing competitiveness 
and making exports and investment the two engines of growth. The strategy succeeded 
on all of these accounts. Competitiveness, as measured by the international reports, has 
been increasing. The 2005 IMD report places Chile in the 19th place under New 
Zealand and above Japan. Many studies show that Chile is the best place to do business 
in Latin America. For example the Kearney offshore location index places Chile 9
th in 
the world and underlines that it ‘offers the best business environment and infrastructure 
in the region’. The strategy was effective in promoting investment and exports, both 
variables grew faster than GNP. While investment averaged 22 per cent of GNP in 
1987-89, it increased to 32 per cent in the period 1995-98. The cooling effect on 
Chilean growth brought on by the Asian crisis decreased the investment rate, but it is 
already increasing its participation in GNP again. 
 
As expected by policymakers in Chile, foreign direct investment was crucial to increase 
total investment. While before 1990 FDI did not reach 0.7 per cent of GNP, in 1990-91 
it more than doubled reaching 1.4 per cent of GNP. In 1997-99 it increased to 7.5 per 
cent and in 2004 it was 7.1 per cent of GNP. Thus over 60 per cent of the increase in 
investment is explained by the increase in FDI. Chile is second, after Ireland, in its 
reception of FDI relative to GNP and it doubles the average of developing countries. It 
is important to notice that democracy brought a large increase in FDI (more than 
double), although the legislation that governed foreign investment was the same that 
under the authoritarian regime. Democracy seems to make a difference for FDI. 
 
Annual exports grew 9.7 per cent in the decade before 1997, while GNP grew 7 per cent 
per year. In 1998-2003 exports grew 6.3 per cent per year, while GNPs growth was 3.1 
per cent. External shocks (in this case the effect of the Asian crisis) have a very large 
effect in Chile, decreasing exports and terms of trade. The price of exports grew 6.2 per 
cent annually in the first period and minus 3.6 per cent per year in the second, which 
explains 1.5 percentage points of reduction in the growth rate. In spite of the fall in 
terms of trade, exports were permanently an engine for growth and, in 2004, accounted 
for one third of GNP. 
   7
This results shows that Chile successfully identified engines for rapid growth, as well as 
instruments to promote exports and investment, but there are a few clouds on the 
horizon that need to be dealt with. As seen, Chile’s growth is very sensitive to 
international cycles and this is so because its structure of exports is still too concentrated 
on commodities that experience sharp changes in terms of trade. Up till now Chile still 
shows little value added in its main exports; this is due to a relatively low investment in 
R&D and to the need for further progress in labour productivity 
2.4  Pending challenges in Chile’s growth strategy 
Chile has suffered a kind of ‘Dutch disease’. The very large and simultaneous growth in 
exports and FDI appreciated the real exchange rate. Between 1990 and 1998 the Chilean 
peso permanently revalued accumulating a change of 45 per cent. After the Asian crisis, 
with its negative impact on exports and terms of trade, the peso devalued, but this 
process was reversed in 2002, as soon as the price of copper started increasing again. 
Mining exports represent 40 per cent of total exports in Chile and when the price of 
copper is very high, as in 2004-05, they come up to about 50 per cent. 
 
Although non-traditional exports have grown, still the structure of exports is dominated 
by low value added exports. If the World’s Bank definition of ‘dominated exports’ is 
considered,4 Chile, relative to Latin America, has kept a high participation of exports 
that do not induce technological change. Landerretche et al. (2004) show that dominated 
exports accounted for a large amount of total exports between 1986-2001 (from 93 per 
cent they decreased to 89 per cent); while in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
same period they decreased from 82 to 55 per cent. 
 
This is partially due and also explains why R&D remains at very low levels in Chile. 
R&D represents 0.6 per cent of GNP, while in the OECD countries it is 2.6 per cent. 
The way this investment is financed also differs drastically—in Chile it is 80 per cent 
public, in OECD countries is 80 per cent private. In other words the private sector in 
Chile is making a very marginal effort to incorporate more value added into exports. 
This is probably related to the uncertainty that generates the permanent changes in the 
real value of the exchange rate and its tendency towards appreciation, making more 
secure and less expensive the export of raw materials.  
 
There is already an agreed way of increasing investment in R&D in Chile. Parliament 
has approved a royalty to the extraction of copper and its entire proceeds will go to 
finance ‘innovation for competitiveness’. Its amount should at least double the present 
level of investment and help overcome the most important missing link in the country’s  
                                                 
4 ‘Dominated’ are those exports where innovation is induced by the companies that provide capital goods. 
Thus its growth does not induce technological development in the domestic economy and the 
incorporation of value added into exports. Commodities lose terms of trade relative to goods and services 
intensive in value added. See Bell and Pavitt (1992).   8
growth strategy. This structure of exports, in turn, has a large social impact through the 
labour market. Although employment, as will be seen, is the most important explanatory 
variable in reducing poverty; exports made no contribution in this respect. As a matter 
of fact, total employment in tradable goods plus construction (this latter sector grew 
very significantly in the first decade) remained practically constant in about 2 million 
employees between 1990 and 2003; while employment in non-tradable goods 
permanently increased from 2.5 million to 3.4 million employees. A large proportion of 
this latter employment was in low quality/productivity jobs in the informal sector, 
SMEs or the personal service sector; which contributed to deteriorate income 
distribution and did not promote competitiveness in the economy as a whole. 
 
Although the unemployment rate in general was not very high (it increased to 10-11 per 
cent around the year 2000); the participation rate of 57 per cent (42 per cent for women) 
is the lowest in Latin America. Labour participation is particularly low among poor 
families and is very elastic to growth in employment opportunities (it increased in the 
first half of the 1990s). The dependency ratio is 4.7 for the poorest 20 per cent and 2.6 
for the wealthiest 20 per cent. Thus if more employment would be generated in the 
export sector, more members of poor families would look and find a job making an 
important addition to family income. The same is true if a largest effort is made to 
support the modernization of SMEs and thus increase the quality of the jobs they 
generate. Exports with more value added and/or more competitive SMEs would also 
reduce the depth and duration of external shocks and, through that, increase the average 
growth rate of the economy. New high quality jobs could be crucial to reduce the 
incidence of poverty and to move towards a more equitable distribution of income. Real 
support to SMEs is a pending challenge for equitable growth. 
3  Reduction of poverty and inequality 
High growth enabled Chile to close in 30 per cent its per capita gap with developed 
countries and to significantly reduce the incidence of poverty and even more of extreme 
poverty. But, during 1990-2003, there was no change in a very regressive income 
distribution structure. In this period the Gini coefficient fluctuated between 0.58 and 
0.57 and the relationship between the income level of the wealthiest and poorest 20 per 
cent of the population was 14 in 1990 and 14.3 in 2003.5  
 
Chile and Brazil were the two Latin American countries with better results in terms of 
poverty reduction, but their relationship to economic growth is very different. Brazil 
reduced its incidence of poverty from 41.4 in 1990 to 29.9 in 2001, but it did not grow 
(per capita GNP grew 0 per cent in the 1990s and 0.1 per cent in 2000-03); while Chile 
grew quite substantially (4.1 per cent per capita per year in the 1990s and 2.1 per cent in 
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2000-03).6 Although Brazilian and Chilean outcomes are quite impressive, Attanassio 
and Székely (2001) show that about 85 per cent of the poverty reduction in Chile is due 
to economic growth, while in Brazil 70 per cent of the decrease can be explained by 
income distribution. 
 
In Chile poverty was mostly reduced because of productivity growth (5 per cent per 
year between 1990 and 2000), which was transferred to higher wages. The minimum 
wage, that receives a large proportion of the poor, increased 70.1 per cent in real terms 
between 1990 and 2004. As average productivity and wages increased at the same pace, 
the functional distribution of income did not change. But higher wages increased 20 per 
cent more than the lower ones, this differential in the growth of wages is an important 
explanation for the regressive personal income distribution.  
 
Throughout this period, the ratio between reduction of poverty and growth of GNP 
constantly varied. It went from 3.9 percentage points of growth for one percentage point 
reduction of poverty in the period of faster growth (1996-98), to 1.8 in the period of 
lower growth but higher expenditure on targeted employment programmes. This is a 
good example of the potential effect of public transfers on income distribution and 
reduction of poverty, if they have a significant amount of resources. With redistribution 
Chile could have done better in reducing poverty. If it would have had permanently the 
growth/reduction of poverty ratio of 1999-2000 it would have eliminated extreme 
poverty and almost all the rest of poverty as well. 
3.1  Inequality and the labour market 
High inequality in Chile, and its permanence through time, is mostly a reflection of 
what happens in the labour market. The poorest 20 per cent have very precarious jobs: 
low productivity and, mostly, informal (53 per cent of the employed have a permanent 
job and 40.3 per cent do not have a labour contract). They also have higher 
unemployment rates (they represent 41.6 per cent of all the unemployed) and higher 
dependency ratios (twice as large as the average). 
 
One of the largest problems, in terms of inequality, is the permanence of informal 
unemployment.7 This was 36.9 per cent of total employment in 1990 and 37.6 per cent 
in 2000. Informal jobs have only 25 per cent of the average productivity of the formal 
ones and thus pay much less. The incidence of poverty among their workers is 26 per 
cent, while in formal jobs is 8.5 per cent, also informal workers are less educated (8.6 
versus 12.2 years in formal employees). Only 50 per cent of informal workers have a 
formal contract (and thus access to social benefits) while 86.5 per cent of formal 
workers have such a contract. 
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7 Informal unemployment is understood as ILO does: workers in firms with 5 or less employees and self 
employed workers that are not professional, technicians or provide domestic services.   10
The permanence of low productivity and informal jobs partially explains why although 
low-income workers increased employment in the decade 1990-2000 at a faster speed 
than high income workers (2.6 per cent versus 1.7 per cent per annum); their per capita 
family income increased less (4.4 per cent versus 5.4 per cent per year). Their 
productivity and wages grow at a lower pace (3.3 per cent versus 4.7 per cent per year) 
and 61.5 per cent of all the high quality jobs created in the decade were captured by 
workers of high income families.8 Although income from labour increased rapidly, its 
distribution became more unequal. Thus the labour market in this period was a source of 
inequality and, at the same time, because of its dynamism, the main explanation for the 
reduction of poverty. 
 
Precarious employment is the source of poverty and inequality in Chile. The 
government tried to support productivity growth in SMEs but with very limited funds 
(in the years 2002-04 these programmes added an amount of U$25 million per annum) 
and had little impact. Increasing productive employment for the poor is the most 
effective tool to overcome poverty and reduce inequalities, as well as coherent with 
growth. This poses two challenges. The first is increasing productivity (training) of the 
poor, the second, more important in the short run, is increasing the productivity of the 
working place. In other words increase the access to capital for SMEs, where the 
majority of the poor work.  
3.2  Social reforms in Chile, income distribution and tax burden 
During the Concertación government, Chile significantly increased its level of social 
expenditure and reformed its policies. Between 1990-2005 social investment more than 
doubled in real terms, its priority was reflected in its increased participation in GNP 
from 12.9 to 16.4 per cent, as well as from 60 to 72 per cent in government expenditure. 
This increase in the volume of social expenditure had an important distributive impact, 
particularly in the period of greater unemployment, where special employment 
programmes for the poor were implemented. The portion of social expenditure that can 
be distributed among income groups implied that income of poor families increased by 
17 per cent between 1990-96, by 46 per cent in 1998-2000 and by 30 per cent 
throughout the period.9 Its redistributive effect can be appreciated by comparing the 
relationship between the average income of the wealthiest and the poorest 20 per cent of 
the population. This, as mentioned, was 14.3 in 2003 for autonomous income (return to 
labour and capital), but it decreases to 7.6 when social expenditure is incorporated and 
total income is considered. Thus social expenditure has an important equalizing effect in 
Chile and has compensated the inequities created in the labour market, maintaining a 
stable income distribution. 
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It is not possible, in this short review, to analyze the important changes that took place 
in each social policy. The most important effort, from 1990 onwards, was on the 
educational sector and geared towards improving equitable access and quality to all 
levels of education. Education is the most important factor behind inequality in Chile, 
explaining between 9 and 40 per cent of it, depending on sample, definition of income, 
method, year, and cohort used. No other factors such as region, gender, occupation 
explain as much as education (Palma 2005). The reforms underway should, in the long 
run, affect both growth and distribution but it is too early to find quantitative results. 
Evaluations of these programmes show that progress is under way, although there still is 
ample room for greater quality in education, as well as to increase coverage at the 
preschool level (which has a large distributive effect). 
 
In 2000 an unemployment insurance scheme was created. This system had some 
solidarity, although benefits are related to private financing, like the private pension 
system which the Concertación government inherited and have not changed in a 
substantial manner. The unemployment insurance does not cover workers with unstable 
or informal employments, which constitute the majority of the jobs of the poor. Also a 
health reform project has been implemented since 2002. The original project had a 
solidarity component incorporated, but was not approved by Congress. 
 
The pension system is the most important pending social reform to increase equity. The 
system is based on individual private accounts and thus reproduces the existing 
inequities in the labour market and excludes workers with no labour contract. Coverage 
of the system increased from 57 to 61 per cent between 1991 and 2003 (still lower than 
the 62 per cent the old system had, but the highest in Latin America). The unprotected 
workers are mostly poor, mainly women and with no or few qualifications. Besides that, 
the return for savings is higher for higher income workers (between 1981 and 2003 it 
was 8.3 per cent per year for non-poor families and 6.4 per cent for the poor ones). In 
addition, monthly savings have not been deposited (by the employer) for an important 
number of, especially low-income, workers. All these implies that if the system were to 
continue as it is, about 50 per cent of the labour force (the poorest) will depend on the 
state for their pensions. The present level of public pensions does not insure that these 
people will be above the poverty line. Solving this situation, depends on the availability 
of public funds, specially because the annual deficit of the private system between 
1999-2003 amounted to 5.9 per cent of GNP that was also covered by public savings.10 
 
Thus equitable growth in Chile depends very strongly on furthering social reforms and 
policies. As seen, all social policies have well functioning and correctly targeted 
programmes whose benefits could increase with additional resources. Also the 
government has reallocated resources in favour of these programmes, as well as 
increased their efficiency; further efforts along this line although positive will have 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed analysis of these figures, see Arenas de Mesa (2005).   12
marginal effects. Greater coverage and/or quality of social programmes require larger 
funding. In all of these areas increasing solidarity towards poor families exclusively 
depends on the availability of public funding. Engel et al. (1997) show that the structure 
of the tax system is quite indifferent from a distributive point of view—what counts is 
the level and targeting of public expenditure. The Gini coefficient could be reduced by 5 
percentage points with an increase in the level of taxes (keeping the present structure of 
expenditure), even if the structure of the tax system turns more regressive. What really 
counts is government social expenditure. 
 
The discussion on the level of taxes has been a permanent issue throughout the 
Concertación government. Three tax reforms have been approved after a prolonged and 
difficult discussion in Congress, but the tax burden has slightly decreased. The tax 
burden was 18.06 per cent of GNP in 1993 and 16.29 per cent ten years later (2003). 
Although all tax reforms were geared to increase taxes (mostly value added tax) and/or 
reduce evasion; the trade agreements that Chile signed plus the unilateral reduction of 
tariffs implied a permanent decrease in the tax burden. Between 1993 and 2003 foreign 
duties decreased its contribution to total taxes from 2.3 per cent of GNP to 0.75 per 
cent, about the same amount in which the tax burden decreased. In 2005 the net tax 
burden has increased to 17.9 per cent of GNP (because of reduction in tax evasion), 
lower than in developed countries (G7 is 26.3 per cent and other OECD are 29.5 per 
cent of GNP). The fact that there has not been an explicit agreement on the tax burden 
in Chile has turned this discussion in a permanently unresolved political issue. 
 
Whichever course of action is taken to reach a more equitable distribution of income, 
the underlying discussion in Chile will be the same one: the tax burden. Given that the 
electoral system in Chile forces an equal representation in Parliament for the opposition, 
it seems unlikely that the political composition of Parliament will change creating new 
conditions for an agreement on a larger tax burden. An important way out of this 
dilemma could be to incorporate new actors into the political dialogue. Until now social 
actors—with the exemption of the business community—have had a very weak voice in 
this discussion and thus all interests have not been adequately represented. A national 
dialogue, on such a crucial strategic issue, is advisable to reach an agreement that is 
clearly necessary to advance in equity and also to end a discussion that introduces 
economic instability. Greater participation of social actors interested in promoting 
equity should strengthen the political viability of a permanent agreement on the tax 
burden that increases financing of social policies. 
4  Institutions for good democratic governance 
Chile made a successful effort to implement reforms that produced simultaneous 
economic, social and political changes. Unlike the rest of Latin America, with this 
reforms Chile grew steadily at a much higher rate than in the past and also reduced 
poverty. Corbo et al. (2005), based on a cross-sectional econometric model, show that   13
Chile’s better performance is explained by the reforms that lead to stronger macro 
fundamentals and, most importantly, better institutions. The study proves that if all 
Latin American countries would have had the post-reform institutions that Chile has, 
their average rate of growth of GNP per capita would have been 1.6 per cent higher per 
year, and Chile grew 2.4 per cent more than the rest. Now if quality of institutions 
would have been similar to the ones of Finland, growth per capita would have been 2.3 
per cent higher. Building and strengthening economic institutions explains more than 
half of the difference in Chile’s growth vis-à-vis the rest of Latin America. 
 
Institution building is also related to the reduction of poverty. The three countries with 
lower incidence of poverty in Latin America (Uruguay, Chile and Costa Rica) are also 
the three with stronger institutions (according to Kaufmann et al. 2003). Brazil is 4th in 
poverty and 5th in institutions. The two most successful countries in reducing poverty in 
Latin America, followed different strategies during the 1990s, but both had in common 
institutional reforms. Chile placed its emphasis in financial and economic institutions 
with a positive response in terms of economic growth. Brazil emphasized reform in 
income transfers with a positive outcome in terms of income distribution. Both routes 
had a positive effect on poverty.  
 
The relationship between equitable growth and institutions is also present in Rodrik’s 
(1999) findings that show that Latin American countries recuperate growth, after 
external shocks, at a lower pace than the rest of the world because of their weak 
institutions. Particularly, because of the inability of these institutions to deal with the 
distributional impacts that external shocks generate. This inability generates political 
and economic instability prolonging the effect of the shocks.  
 
When it comes to political institutions, there still is a discussion in Chile about its 
transition to democracy. Some argue that it was completed at the beginning of the 1990s 
when Chile proved it could live under democratic rules and deal with the human rights 
problems that took place under the Pinochet regime. Others argue that it just concluded 
with the approval (June 2005) of the amendments to the Constitution that eliminated the 
non-democratic institutions inherited from the Pinochet regime. Finally there are some 
who say that there is still one pending issue, the electoral system, which although taken 
out of the Constitution is still undemocratic. What is clear is that Chile has been able to 
deal with its problems under democratic rule and improve the quality of its institutions 
in a democratic manner.  
 
It is also clear that institutions could still be perfected from a democratic point of view. 
The real test for democracy is the way it is perceived by the population and its degree of 
democratic participation. In Chile support to democracy has grown from 54 per cent in 
1996 to 57 per cent in 2004, in the same period in Latin America it decreased from 61 to   14
53 per cent of the population.11 But, one half of those that support democracy believe 
that it has big problems and that the worst problem is poverty and inequality. Most 
people (70 per cent in Chile) also believe that governments are run for and by the 
wealthy and powerful. Also 41 per cent of the population does not participate in 
democratic elections and only 53 per cent of the people with the right to vote feel it is 
important to do it. Democracy still needs to be strengthened. 
 
Democracy and equitable growth are strongly related. García (2003) shows a positive 
correlation between income distribution and support to democracy in Latin America, the 
stronger inequality the least satisfaction with democracy. There is also a relationship 
between the economic cycle and support to democracy. In Chile, 1997 was the last year 
of a prolonged period of growth: democracy support was at its peak (61 per cent) as it 
also was satisfaction with it (37 per cent); the opposite took place on 2001 (lowest point 
of the cycle and where democracy had 45 per cent of support and 23 per cent of 
satisfaction). Reduction of poverty also had a positive effect on the political arena; Chile 
(as well as Brazil, Uruguay and Costa Rica have) strongly supported democratic 
government. The Chilean president, although completing his mandate, is among the 
most approved in Latin America (65 per cent). 
 
Confidence in institutions is also related to inequity. Equal rights or access is the most 
important variable (47 per cent) to define the level of confidence in an institution, the 
second reason (28 per cent) is that they fulfil promises. Prevailing inequality in Chile 
reduced confidence in the market economy, 36 per cent of the population (the highest in 
Latin America) express satisfaction with the market economy, while 51 per cent are 
unsatisfied. Lack of confidence also affects other institutions, governments, the judicial 
system, Congress, and political parties (in that order) were conceived as the least 
reliable institutions because they are perceived as unequal in ensuring rights and 
opportunities (their level of confidence varied between 14 and 25 per cent). 
 
The lack of support to democracy and confidence in institutions, as a result of prevailing 
inequality, in turn, can have an economic impact. The last report of Business Monitor 
International,12 that evaluates country risk, places Chile at number 20 out of 127 
countries analyzed. But while Chile is number 7 in present political stability; it comes 
down to 27 in future political stability.  
 
Surprisingly enough, dealing with the weakness of institutions related to distributional 
issues was not an important aspect, or was definitely not present, on the reform package 
of the 1990s in most countries in Latin America. In Chile there were three frustrated 
                                                 
11 Information on democracy and social support comes from ‘Latinbarometro 2004, Una década 
de  mediciones’, Corporación Latinbarómetro, Santiago Chile, 13 August 2004. See 
wwww.latinbarometro.org. 
12 See www.businessmonitor.com.   15
efforts to create a tripartite dialogue institution that could deal with the egalitarian 
development agenda, none of them survive now. There also were partial reforms in the 
labour code, social security and the tax system, all crucial from a distributional point of 
view. Building or strengthening institutions able to deal with distributional issues is an 
ongoing challenge in Chile and Latin America. 
 
As mentioned to advance in equality, it is particularly important to reach a widespread 
agreement on the tax burden. A good starting point, already used in the last tax reform, 
is to continue reducing tax evasion which could simultaneously increase government 
revenues and allow for rationalizing the system including tax cuts. The possibility of a 
further reduction in tax evasion is proven by the fact that the wealthiest 10 per cent of 
Chileans get 41.2 per cent of total income and their marginal income tax rate is 40 per 
cent but the total revenue of this tax is only 4.1 per cent of GNP. If the wealthiest 10 per 
cent were to pay 40 per cent of their marginal income and the economy would continue 
to grow at 6 per cent a year; the additional amount of income-tax collected in four years 
would enable a doubling of income by the poorest 40 per cent eliminating poverty in 
Chile. 
5  Conclusion: a national strategic vision on the equity agenda 
Chile has followed a well defined and successful development strategy for a prolonged 
period of time. It has done better than any other time in its history, better than all other 
Latin American countries and has partially closed the gap with developed countries. 
Although there was progress in all three main goals of the strategy, it lagged behind in 
the equity objectives. Remaining inequality, in turn, has weakened the confidence in 
democratic institutions. Strong institutions, on the other hand, are a good part of the 
explanation of why Chile did so well.  
 
Many of the changes that Chile made during the last 16 years provide a positive 
experience for other Latin American countries. This is the case of the successful and 
innovative fiscal rule that reduces the depth of the cycle in countries where commodity 
exports play an important role. Another important lesson has been the priority given to 
social reform, in terms of the allocation of public funds and the reduction of tax evasion 
as a means of financing these reforms. Microeconomic changes, in the areas of 
regulation, transparency and public efficiency have also proven important to promote 
competitiveness. A crucial tool for the competitive objective has been the private 
concession of public infrastructures that increased total investment in this area. Chile 
has several good practices to show to other Latin American countries. 
 
Although Chile’s development outcome has been positive, the challenge to progress 
simultaneously on growth, distribution and democratization remains valid. These 
objectives seem highly probable to combine, according to econometric evidence. Cornia 
(2005) shows that high inequality (Gini coefficient over 0.45) limits economic growth.   16
Thus, redistribution should foster growth, especially if it is done through investment in 
increasing productivity of the poor. Marshall (2004) shows that closing productivity 
gaps with developed countries would enable Chile to increase its average rate of growth 
by 2 per cent. Greater equity on the other hand will strengthen trust in democratic 
institutions which, in turn, also strengthens growth perspectives making possible the 
realization of a virtuous circle between growth, distribution and democratization. 
 
After 16 years the strategic vision raised by the Concertación government, has proven to 
be realistic and it has been adopted by all political parties; undoubtedly a very important 
political success of the governmental coalition. The presidential campaign that has 
recently taken place (elections in December 2005) has assigned first priority to equity 
and distribution. But, recent experience shows that political agreements in an electoral 
period do not necessarily imply that opposition parties will later support governmental 
actions to implement them. This is particularly true for the most controversial 
instruments, such as the tax and labour reform, where the opposition has voted against 
them or forced a political agreement that minimizes their effects. The fact that electoral 
agreements are implicit (there is no explicit commitment on specific actions to be 
implemented) and do not involve social partners; weakens its national representation 
and its possibilities of realization.  
 
The road to progress in equity and redistribution is well known in Chile. Inequality is 
mostly explained by the precarious working conditions of the poor: unemployment, 
underemployment, informal employment and low investment in human capital. Thus, 
redistribution can be done directly through an increase in existing social programmes 
(that are efficient and well targeted) or indirectly through increasing productivity of 
poor workers at a faster pace than average (which requires training, support to SMEs, 
and compliance with labour standards). More public resources are required to finance 
the road to equitable growth. 
 
Increasing the tax burden has been the major difficulty and the crucial stepping stone 
towards greater equality. The fact that it has not been done has reduced the pace of 
progress towards equality, and also has permanently kept in the political agenda a 
source of conflict and economic instability. These political difficulties remain present 
and will probably continue in the future because political actors have divergent interests 
ones a Government-opposition relationship is established. 
 
Given the widespread political support to Concertación’s strategic vision and its 
positive but incomplete outcome, it is necessary to create an explicit national agreement 
that involves political and social actors on an equity agenda. That is, on the content and 
priority of the social reforms to be implemented, the accountability procedures and the 
required tax burden to ensure their implementation. This strategic agreement should also 
strengthen the voice of the social partners that benefit from redistribution and 
democratization and that, until now, have had little presence in decision making. The   17
social partners would provide more stable conditions for the implementation of the 
equity agenda. Creating an institution that involves all stakeholders and agrees on a 
socioeconomic agenda has been crucial in most countries that have combined growth 
and distribution as well as greater social participation in the democratic process.13 
 
A formal social pact that explicitly agrees on a strategic vision, its priorities, expected 
outcomes and financing sources, is an important missing link in Chile’s successful 
development strategy. 
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